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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution never established the right to appeal.1 The
common law never recognized the appeal as an absolute right.2 Any “right” to
appeal is “purely a creature of statute”3 that evolved to become a central component
in the litigation process.4
Thus, imagine civil litigation without the appeal. A pretrial motion is filed, and
the judge denies it. The case continues, and the parties endure litigation that
culminates in a trial.5 An unfavorable judgment is rendered. The client’s mid-size
company just spent over two years6 investing at least one million dollars in
litigation.7 Looking at the record, the court clearly erred in failing to grant the
pretrial motion to dismiss. But, the case is over. One million dollars later, the
attorney and client find no relief from legal community.
The imagined situation is often the reality even where the appeal process exists.
For instance, the current use of the federal interlocutory appeal process operates
much like an appeal-less system. A pretrial motion is filed, the interlocutory order is
given, and the petition for interlocutory review is usually denied.8 Thus, the case
continues. It may continue into settlement negotiations or go to trial where the
losing party files an appeal. That final appeal could find that the lower court erred,
1

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); see also McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684
(1894).
2

McKane, 153 U.S. at 684.

3

Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977).

4

Some form of an appeal always existed in the federal system. See infra Part II; see also
infra note 19.
5

Assuming the case occurred in 2009, it would be one of 5,360 cases that went to trial
from 276,397 civil filings. Judicial Bus. 2010, U.S. District Courts—Civil: Civil Cases Filed,
by Origin, 2006 Through 2010, U.S. COURTS tbl.S-7 (2010), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness2010.aspx; see also
Judicial Facts & Figures 2010, U.S. District Courts—Combined Civil and Criminal: Civil and
tbl.6.4
(2010),
available
at
Criminal
Trials
Completed,
U.S. COURTS
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/JudicialFactsAndFigures2010.asp
x. In 2010, only one percent of cases reached trial. Statistical Tables for the Federal
Judiciary, U.S. COURTS tbl.C-4 (2010) [hereinafter Table C-4], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2010/dec
10/C04 Dec10.pdf.
6

In 2009, the average length of a civil suit before going to trial was 24.8 months. This
statistic assumes the case did not fall within the 11.7 percent of cases over three years old, or
36,829 cases. Fed. Court Mgmt. Statistics, U.S. District Court—Judicial Caseload Profile,
U.S. COURTS (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ viewer.aspx?doc=/cgibin/cmsd2010Sep.pl.
7
FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P., FULBRIGHT’S 6TH ANNUAL LITIGATION TRENDS SURVEY
REPORT (2009). Approximately 38 percent of midsize companies spent at least one million
dollars on civil litigation. The same study found that 13 percent of small companies spent at
least $1 million annually in litigation costs (the number was 4 percent in 2007). The largest
companies had a much smaller increase in companies spending at least $1 million annually as
the percentage grew from 75 percent in 2007 to 78 percent in 2009. Id.
8

See Hess, Parker & Toufanian, infra note 59.
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rendering that trial meritless. In reaching any of those stages, the adversely affected
party more than likely devoted unnecessary time, resources, and finances in the case.
Additionally, the parties are often unable to predict success when making a petition
or appeal. Under the current system, the court does not provide any explanation to
the party regarding the reasons the petition was denied. Instead, the system relies
upon a broad set of confusing criteria to qualify for a grant of an interlocutory appeal
without requiring any explanation to accompany the decision.9
The unfairness and confusion created by the current interlocutory appeal system
invites many suggestions for change, including eliminating all appeals.10 While the
above example briefly demonstrates that this elimination is too drastic,11 it is also
impractical because historically the appellate process prohibited such an extreme
change.12 More importantly, this measure is unnecessary. The state court systems
offer demonstrative examples of successful techniques that decrease unfairness
without sacrificing judicial efficiency. Thus, there is no reason to eliminate, or even
create, a completely new appellate system. Rather, by adopting federalism’s
historical tenet of “states as laboratories,”13 the interlocutory appeal system can be
refined.
Within the paradigm of the scientific method, this Note explains the problems
with the current interlocutory appellate system and offers accessible techniques
utilized in the states for its improvement. In Part II, this Note briefly explains the
research to outline the historical evolution of the final judgment rule. While this
section highlights the benefits of the rule, it also details the rule’s expansion as a
response to concerns that the federal appellate framework was inefficient, unfair, and
oftentimes confusing.
In Part III.A-B., this Note develops its thesis by examining the state court
systems that are already in place. These state systems are the “experiments.” The
state experiments provide ample evidence of techniques that work and show possible
problems that may arise before considering its adoption at the federal level. Then,
this Note argues that combining the strongest techniques employed at the state level
would improve efficiency and fairness14 at the federal level, while maintaining the
balance between the court and parties’ interests.
Part III.C. extends the analysis to demonstrate the need to require written
opinions to accompany decisions. Such a requirement would help to facilitate
changes to the federal interlocutory appeal system. Not only do written opinions
balance efficiency and fairness between the court and parties, but mandated opinions
could also bring insight and clarity to a confusing process. Thus, like the state

9

See infra Part IV.

10

See Carelton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE. L. J. 539,
560-63 (1932) (stating “the concept of the final judgment is wholly unsatisfactory as a method
of” restricting appeals.”).
11

For an explanation on why appeals are beneficial, see Robertson, infra note 89.

12

See infra Part III.

13

See, e.g., New State Ice, Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
14

Fairness applies to both the judges and the parties.
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experiments, written opinions would offer evidence of any problems and any trends
within the courts that could guide future procedural changes.
II. THE RESEARCH: THE INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS PROCESS WITHIN THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM
A. The Evolution of the Final Judgment Rule
The right to appeal has become a central tenet of American law. The right is
“sacrosanct,”15 and credited with improving the federal courts’ “ability to administer
justice in a regular, evenhanded, and confidence-inspiring manner.”16 Generally, the
right to appeal may only be exercised after the trial court renders a final decision.17
Such timing is a prerequisite for exercising the right to appeal. Some version of this
finality requirement has existed in the United States since 1789.18 The United States
Congress adopted the English common law,19 and later codified the requirement in
28 U.S.C. § 1291.20
The finality requirement is not unwarranted. Rather, the final judgment rule
exists to serve at least four purposes for the various groups involved.21 First, the rule
guards against the interruption of court proceedings by allowing an organized court
record to fully develop before review.22
15
Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.
J. 62, 64 (1985) (questioning the desirability of appeals and offers proposals that the appeals
be limited to certain categories of cases).
16
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the Frankfurterian Paradigm: Reflections on
Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 712 (1999) (exploring the
history of the federal courts and attempting to explain the growing interest in the structure and
development of the lower courts).
17
See Laura C. Baucus, How Long Should Bad Attorneys Have to Wait? The Immediate
Appeal of Attorney Sanctions Under the Collateral Order Doctrine, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 289,
290 (2000).
18
Specifically, the rule was embodied in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat.
73, 84.
19
Presented in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the rule developed from English common law.
The appellate court was required to take the entire record under consideration, thereby making
appeals before a final decision problematic since the King’s Bench and the trial court could
not review the record simultaneously. See Gerald T. Wetherington, Appellate Review of Final
and Non-Final Orders in Florida Civil Cases—An Overview, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3,
Summer 1984, at 61-62.
20
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1948) (declaring that the federal appellate courts only have
jurisdiction “from all final decisions of the district courts”); see also Midland Asphalt Corp. v.
United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989) (discussing the history of 28 U.S.C. § 1291).
21
See, e.g., Robert Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right
Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717 (1993). Professor Martinaeu noted the rule
“serves the purposes of some or most parties and prospective parties, their lawyers, the trial
court, the appellate court, and ultimately the public.” Id. at 771.
22
See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430 (1985) (“[I]mmediate review
of every trial court ruling, while permitting more prompt correction of erroneous decisions,
would impose unreasonable disruption, delay, and expense.”).
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Second, prohibiting non-final appeals prevents piecemeal adjudication,23 thus
reducing delays for the parties and courts.24 Throughout early American history,
courts sought to avoid piecemeal adjudication by imposing the finality requirement
as a mechanism for preventing delays.25 In 1830, Justice Story praised the restriction
as a method for discouraging successive appeals, which could “occasion very great
delays and oppressive expenses.”26 Likewise, Chief Justice Marshall inferred that
Congress intended the final judgment rule be used to avoid “all the delays and
expense incident to a repeated revision” of successive appeals on a single issue.27
Third, the rule reduces “encroach[ment] upon the prerogatives of district court
judges.”28 District court judges can freely exercise their discretion when making a
decision without repeated interruption by a second court. This approach thus
preserves the respect and independence owed to trial judges as the initial
adjudicators.29 For instance, if a trial judge’s ruling could be challenged instantly on
a whim, the judge’s authority and function could be significantly undermined.30
Fourth, the final judgment rule is believed to promote an efficient judicial
system.31 The rule prevents parties from using the appeals process to harass
opponents, particularly wealthy parties filing separate appeals as a strategy to drain
the opposition’s financial resources.32 Further, lawyers are able to litigate cases
economically, without needless appeals that serve no purpose but to appease the

23

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981).

24

See Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 472 U.S. at 430 (stating that the final judgment rule
avoids the delays that appellate interruptions would cause).
25
See, e.g., Rutherford v. Fisher, 4 U.S. (4. Dall.) 22 (1800) (holding an order denying the
statute of limitations defense is not appealable); see also Canter v. Am. Ins. Co., 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 307, 310 (1830) (holding that the question of whether damages may or may not be
assessed at all was not appealable); Martineau, supra note 21.
26
Canter, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 430 (holding that damages for interlocutory appeals were
interlocutory and thus not appealable).
27

United States v. Bailey, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 267, 268-69 (1835).

28

Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 603 (2009) (quoting Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 449 U.S. at 374; see also Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 472 U.S. at 430 (“It would
also undermine the ability of district judges to supervise litigation.”).
29
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 449 U.S. at 374 (“Permitting piecemeal appeals would
undermine the independence of the district judge, as well as the special role that individual
plays in our judicial system.”); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170
(1974) (the final judgment rule “prevents the debilitating effect on judicial administration
caused by piecemeal appellate disposition of what is, in practical consequence, but a single
controversy.”).
30

Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 472 U.S. at 430.

31

CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR
AND PROCEDURE § 3907 (1992).

R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE

32

John C. Nagel, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Jurisprudence with
Discretionary Review, 44 DUKE L. J. 200, 203 (1994).
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client.33 The final judgment rule effectuates these policies by precluding appellate
review of most interlocutory rulings.34
B. Problems with the Final Judgment Rule
The final judgment rule effectively promotes the above policies, but the strict and
limited application of the rule has significant drawbacks.35 Chiefly, a trial court’s
decisions may have “serious and continuous effects”36 on litigation that cannot be
restored if the appeal is delayed, whereas an immediate appeal could shorten,
streamline, or even end litigation. For instance, there has been greater emphasis on
the importance of pretrial case management.37 With increased pretrial rulings, strict
adherence to the final judgment rule could advance what may turn out to be a
potentially meritless trial.38 This is especially problematic given the increased
emphasis on pretrial activity. In a study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center,
several attorneys reported that since Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly39 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,40 there has been an increase in the number of motions filed, without an
increase in the likelihood that the motion would be granted.41 Thus, attorneys face
33

See also WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 31, at 279.

34

See Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: A New “Serbonian Bog” and
Four Proposals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539, 542 (“[T]he general run of pretrial
orders—denials of motions to dismiss, discovery orders, joinder decisions, denial of summary
judgment, scheduling orders, and so on—cannot be appealed until the case is over.”).
35
Margaret L. Anderson, The Immediate Appealability of Rule 11 Sanctions, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 683, 689 (1991) (“[A]lthough the final judgment rule has been an effective
means of promoting these policies, courts also recognize that the rule can lead to harsh
results.”).
36
S. Christian Mullgarat, Settlement Agreements and the Collateral Order Doctrine: A
Step in the Wrong Direction?, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 155, 158 (1995) (citing R. STERN,
APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 79 (2d ed. 1989)).
37
See Adam Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1241
(citing Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1265–66 (2005)).
38

In 2010, 314,233 civil cases were filed with 229,448 terminated during the pretrial
phase. Table C-4, supra note 5.
39

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

40

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 622 (2009). It is this author’s belief that the pleading
standards arising out of Twombly and Iqbal are the most recent developments in civil litigation
that would have an impact on the pretrial stage, and thus on the number of interlocutory
orders.
41
EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGIG, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IN THEIR WORDS:
ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 1–2 (Mar.
2010), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/%20lookup/costciv3.pdf/$file/cost
civ3.pdf (“To supplement the multivariate analysis, . . . the Center . . . interview[ed] a number
of the attorneys who responded to the case-based survey. . . . This report documents those
interviews, organizing them where possible to track the results of the multivariate analyses.”).
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States asked
the Federal Judicial Center to conduct a study on the costs of federal civil litigation. EMERY
G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGIG, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION COSTS IN CIVIL CASES:
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increased costs due to increased pretrial filings in addition to the rising costs incurred
in litigation.
Even when the delay of appellate review is not a threat, strict adherence to the
finality requirement can drain both the courts’ and the parties’ time and financial
resources. In the same study mentioned above, the attorneys reported that the
additional pretrial activity increased the costs of litigating their cases.42 Thus, when
an erroneous trial court ruling on a pretrial motion cannot be immediately
corrected,43 the parties may be forced to waste additional time and money on a
meritless trial after investing such resources in increased pretrial activities.44
C. Attempts to Reduce the Harshness of the Final Judgment Rule
1. A Statutory Expansion: 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)45
Recognition of these drawbacks led Congress and the Court to create exceptions
to the finality requirement.46 Both branches found that an opportunity to appeal from
a non-final order may “prevent irreparable harm to a party, advance the termination
of the litigation, or serve some broader public interest, [so] there have been constant
efforts to make exceptions to the finality requirement.”47
The first significant change expanded 28 U.S.C. § 1292.48 In expanding the
statute, Congress sought to curtail inefficiency and injustice caused by a strict
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RULES 2-4 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
costciv1.pdf/$file/costciv1.pdf. In 2009, the Center conducted a survey of a random sample
of attorneys that were involved cases that were terminated in the last quarter of 2008. The
Center supplemented this survey with interviews of some of the responding attorneys. “This
report, prepared for the Committee’s March 2010 meeting, presents multivariate analysis of
litigation costs in the closed cases.” Id.; see also JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL vii (Mar. 2011), available
at www.fjc.gov/public/pdf. nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf (finding that
“[t]here was a general increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate of filing of motions to dismiss
for failure to state a claim . . . [but] no increase in the rate of grants of motions to dismiss”).
42
LEE & WILLIG, supra note 41. While the study did not report costs, it is plausible that
increased filings would increase the costs of litigation. This is an assumption by the author.
43

See Anderson, supra note 35.

44

Baucus, supra note 17, at 295.

45

Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West 2012).

46
There are a number of other statutory exceptions to the finality requirement not
discussed in this paper. The statutory exceptions to section 1291 include sections 1291(a)(2)
and (3), which permit appeals from an interlocutory order “appointing receivers, or refusing
orders to wind up receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof” and allow
non-final appeals in admiralty cases. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291(a)(2)-3) (West 2012). The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure also provide an appeal through writs of mandamus and certification
of partial final judgments under FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
47

Martineau, supra note 21, at 788; see also Pierre H. Bergeron, A New Vision of
Appellate Jurisdiction Over Orders Compelling Arbitration, 51 EMORY L. J. 1365, 1369
(2002) (“[I]interlocutory review is largely unavailable in a significant number of cases in
which it should be appropriate.”).
48

28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West 2012).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013

7

266

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:259

adherence to the final judgment rule.49 Initially, the Judicial Conference of the
United States proposed a statute that would have granted interlocutory appeals by
permission of the court of appeals that were “necessary or desirable to avoid
substantial injustice.”50 But, this language was strongly opposed.51 Once Congress
struck that language, the amendment immediately became codified as 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b).52
Congress and the courts viewed this addition as an effort to “improve and
expedite the administration of justice in the courts.”53 The new subsection permits
an early appeal of limited types of interlocutory orders. Specifically, the district
court may54 certify an order “involv[ing] a controlling question of law as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”55
Once a district court certifies the order, the appellate court exercises its discretion

49
James P. Weygandt, Motions for Appointment of Counsel and the Collateral Order
Doctrine, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1547, 1550 (1985); see also Martineau, supra note 21, at 788 (a
non-final order sometimes “would prevent irreparable harm to a party, advance the
termination of litigation, or serve some broader public interest, [so] there have been constant
efforts to make exceptions to the finality requirement to allow early appeals in some cases.”).
50

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF SPECIAL
FOR THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 203 (Mar. 20-21, 1952).

SESSION

51
The grounds for the objections were not stated in the report; however, another author
offers a compelling suggestion stating that it was “likely that objections were raised to the
procedure for direct application to the courts of appeals and to the breadth of the standard
controlling review.” Such objections were raised in the “debate” between Judge Frank and
Chief Judge Charles E. Clark that was carried on in the Second Circuit for some fifteen years
before the action of the Judicial Conference. Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal
Courts Under 28 USC Section 1292(b), 88 HARV. L. REV. 607, 610 n.13 (1975) (referencing
Audi Vision, Inc. v. RCA Mfg. Co., 136 F.2d 621, 627 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J.) and Zalkind
v. Scheinman, 139 F.2d 895, 907-08; n.5 (2d Cir. 1943) (Clark, J., dissenting)).
52

28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West 2012).

53

H.R. Res. 6238, 85th Cong. (1st Sess. 1957) (testimony of Chief Judge Parker of the
Fourth Circuit at the House Committee on the Judiciary on February 26, 1958). The Judicial
Conference of the United States viewed the bill as a compromise between those who did not
want any expansion of interlocutory appeals and those who did. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT,
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 713-16 (4th ed. 1983); see also H.R. REP. NO. 85-1667, at 1
(1958) (stating the purpose of section 1292(b) was “to expedite the ultimate termination of
litigation and thereby save unnecessary expense and delay” by allowing appeal of certain nonfinal orders). Id.
54
The judge uses her discretion whether to grant or deny the petition for an interlocutory
appeal. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978).
55
28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West 2012). The “controlling question of law” standard has
generally been held to “encompass at the very least every order which, if erroneous, would be
reversible error on final appeal.” Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 755 (3d Cir.
1975). But as this Note explains, even if a dispute satisfies the criteria, there is no guarantee
the petition will be granted.
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whether to permit the appeal.56 Thus, for an appeal under section 1292(b) to be
heard, both the district court and the appellate court must agree to the appeal.
By its terms, section 1292(b) is a limited exception to the final judgment rule.
The plain language of section 1292(b) narrowly restricts its applications to a few
limited circumstances, and the courts have refused to apply the statute broadly.57
Particularly, courts interpreted section 1292(b) to be used “sparingly,” with most
circuits restricting its application to “exceptional” or “big” cases.58 Between 1995
and 2010, 117 petitions were filed pursuant to section 1292(b) in the Federal Circuit,
but only thirty-four percent were granted.59 Even more significant is that the
Supreme Court has expressly stated that an appellate court may refuse to hear a
section 1292(b) appeal “for any reason, including docket congestion,”60 regardless of
whether the petition met the criteria of section 1292(b). Hence, the consequences are
that the statutory exception is (1) not often used and (2) when used, is not often
successful.61
56

28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (West 2012). The Court of Appeals “may refuse to entertain
such an appeal in much the same manner that the Supreme Court today refuses to entertain
application for writs of certiorari.” S. REP. NO. 85-2434 (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5255, 5257.
57
Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1171-74, 1193-96 (1990).
58

See, e.g., Milbert v. Bison Labs., Inc., 260 F.2d 431, 435 (3d Cir. 1958) (declaring that
“Congress intended that section 1292(b) should be sparingly applied. It is to be used only in
exceptional cases where an intermediate appeal may avoid protracted and expensive litigation
and is not intended to open the floodgates to a vast number of appeals”); Bobolakis v.
Compania Panamena Maritima San Gerassimo, 168 F. Supp. 236, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)
(stating “it is clear that this legislation was aimed at the ‘big’ and expensive case where an
unusual amount of time and money may be expended in the pre-trial phases of the case or
where the trial itself is likely to be long and costly.”); S. REP. NO. 85-2434, at 5259 (1958)
(“[A]ppeals under this legislation should only be used in exceptional cases where an
intermediate appeal may avoid protracted and expensive legislation and is not to be used or
granted in ordinary litigation where the issues raised can otherwise be properly disposed of.”).
59

Alexandra B. Hess, Stephanie L. Parker & Tala K. Toufanian, Permissive Interlocutory
Appeals at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Fifteen Years in Review (1995-2010),
60 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 764 (2011).
60
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978). Additionally, interlocutory
appeals were only to be authorized to avoid “protracted and expensive litigation.” Paschall v.
Kan. City Star Co., 605 F.2d 403, 406 (8th Cir. 1979); see also Kraus v. Bd. of Cnty. Road
Comm’rs, 364 F.2d 919, 922 (6th Cir. 1966) (Section 1292(b) “was not intended to authorize
interlocutory appeals in ordinary suits for personal injuries or wrongful death that can be tried
and disposed of on their merits in a few days.”). The same view dates back to the original
codification of the final judgment rule in Milbert, 260 F.2d at 433.
61

In the early years of section 1292(b), the Annual Reports of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Court suggested that applications to the court of
appeals pursuant to section 1292(b) were made in approximately one-hundred cases per year.
Roughly half of these applications were granted. Interlocutory Appeals, supra note 51, at 607
n.5. The statistics do not reveal the behavior of the district courts. Id. In the Seventh Circuit:
“Since the beginning of 1999, this court has received 31 petitions for interlocutory appeal
under . . . § 1292(b) and has granted only six of them.” Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of
Ill., 219 F.3d 674, 675 (7th Cir. 2000). A majority of the denials were “for jurisdictional
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2. A Judicially Created Exception to the Final Judgment Rule: The Collateral Order
Doctrine62
The judicial branch also created an exception to the final judgment rule known as
the collateral order doctrine. The Court first developed the collateral order doctrine
in 1949 in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation.63 There, the Court
identified the existence of a “small class” of interlocutory orders that could be
immediately appealable.64 Specifically, the Court explained that this “small class”
regarded “claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the
action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated.”65 For nearly two decades the courts of appeals liberally applied the
collateral order doctrine.66
Eventually, the Supreme Court limited the collateral order doctrine’s
applicability. Consistent with 28 U.S.C § 1292’s limited application, the collateral
order doctrine has also been applied in narrow circumstances.67 To qualify within
the “small class” of claims permitted by Cohen’s collateral order doctrine, the Court
in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay established that an immediate appeal under Cohen
must:
(1) Conclusively determine the disputed question;
(2) Resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the
action; and

reasons.” Id. Additionally in the Second Circuit: “§ 1292(b) has not caused a large problem
in the federal appellate court. . . . The public record of the Second Circuit for the years 1994
and 1995 reveals a total for the two years of 35 motions for leave to appeal under § 1292(b),
of which only eight were granted.” Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., 101 F.3d 863, 866 (2d
Cir. 1996).
62
Besides the collateral order doctrine, the other judicially created exceptions pertain to
property. See Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848). These exceptions are rarely
used, but are discussed in 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3929 (2d ed.) (West 2011).
63
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 543 (1949). In Cohen, a plaintiff
brought a stockholder’s derivative action under diversity jurisdiction. Id. The district court
judge refused to apply a state law that required the plaintiff to first file a security bond where
the plaintiff held less than five percent of the total stock outstanding. The order was not final,
thus the plaintiff’s case could proceed. Id. at 545. But, the Court found the order appealable,
resolving an issue collateral to the merits of the case. Id. at 546-47.
64

Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.

65

Id.

66

Martineau, supra note 21, at 740. During the twenty year period, few orders did not
qualify as appealable under the Cohen opinion. Id.
67
The Court held that the collateral order doctrine “is best understood not as an exception
to the ‘final decision’ rule laid down by Congress in § 1291, but as a ‘practical construction’
of it.” Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994); see also
Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916-17 (1997) (holding that Cohen was the source for an
expanded “definition” of the term “final decision”).
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(3) Be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.68
Over the years, the doctrine’s application to a “small class” of decisions eroded.69
The collateral order doctrine now permits an immediate appeal of a wide-array of
non-final orders.70 Broadening the doctrine’s application may have improved a
party’s situation, but it resulted in inconsistencies among the circuit courts. The
circuits differ on defining and determining the types of interlocutory orders that
qualify within the doctrine’s scope. For instance, courts differ upon the role of
“importance” in the application of the collateral order doctrine. The D.C. Circuit
and Third Circuit define Cohen “separability” as imposing a requirement that the
appeal must be “important.”71 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit does not even reference
“importance” in its analysis of collateral order decisions.72 Additionally, courts are
split on the application of “unreviewability.” The First and Seventh circuits require
the presence of “irreparable harm” as the basis for jurisdiction,73 whereas the Sixth,
Tenth, and sometimes the First and Seventh Circuits require that rights be
irretrievably lost before an order can qualify as collateral.74 Such ambiguity in the

68

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).

69

The Supreme Court still uses language of the “small class” to define the appealability of
an interlocutory order. See Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995)
(stating “[t]hat small category includes only decisions that are conclusive, that resolve
important questions separate from the merits, and that are effectively unreviewable on appeal
from the final judgment in the underlying action.”). It is my opinion that the “small class” is
merely a term of art because the “class” has since enlarged. Moreover, the phrase serves to
sustain the Court’s support of the final judgment rule and its belief that the collateral order
doctrine “never be allowed to swallow the general rule that a party is entitled to a single
appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v.
Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 605 (2009) (citing Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 868 (citation
omitted); see also Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006) (“emphasizing [the doctrine’s]
modest scope”).
70

See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 512 (1985) (holding that the doctrine permits the
immediate appeal of pretrial orders denying the qualified immunity defense advanced by a
defendant in a civil rights action); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172 (1974)
(finding that the doctrine applies to orders in a class action dispute where the defendant
assumes the costs of notice). Although this Note is limited to civil cases, the same narrow
application of the Cohen doctrine is true in criminal cases. See, e.g., Midland Asphalt Corp. v.
United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (stating that the Cohen doctrine is to be interpreted
“with the utmost strictness”) (quoting Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984)).
71
Separability is defined where “an issue is important if the interests that would
potentially go unprotected without immediate appellate review of that issue are significant
relative to efficiency interests sought to be advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule.”
United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing In re Ford
Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 959 (3d Cir. 1997)).
72

See Under Seal v. Under Seal, 326 F.3d 479, 481 (4th Cir. 2003).

73

See Kristin B. Gerdy, “Important” and “Irreversible” but Maybe Not “Unreviewable”:
The Dilemma of Protecting Defendants’ Rights Through the Collateral Order Doctrine, 38
U.S.F. L. REV. 213, 236-37 (2004).
74

Id.
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manner the doctrine is applied results in confusion. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has resolved and clarified only a handful of these circuit splits.75
3. Other Exceptions to the Final Judgment Rule76
The Supreme Court also recognizes two exceptions to the final judgment rule
within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The first, codified in Rule 54(b), is
invoked in cases involving multiple claims or parties.77 Under this rule, a district
court judge may directly enter a judgment for one or more, but less than all, of the
claims or parties if the judge makes an express determination that there is no just
reason to delay entry.78 This judgment may be immediately appealed.79
On its face, Rule 54(b) appears to violate the definition of “final decision”
because it permits early judgment on any claim. The Court explained that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow joinder of claims and parties, which “in turn,
demonstrate[s] a need for relaxing the restriction upon what should be treated as a
judicial unit for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.”80 This judicial unit concept “was
developed from the common law which had dealt with litigation generally less
complicated than much of that today.”81 Accordingly, Rule 54(b)’s relaxation on
finality is limited to cases involving multiple claims and thus does not directly
contradict the final judgment rule.
The second exception is embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f).82
Before its amendment in 1998, interlocutory review of class certification was subject
to the same stringent requirements and restraints of the final judgment rule.83 Today,
Rule 23(f) provides:
A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of
a district court granting or denying class action certification under this
rule if application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order. An

75
See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 603 (holding that disclosure orders adverse
to attorney-client privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order
doctrine); Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 624 (2009) (allowing interlocutory
appeal to a non-signatory seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement).
76
While this Note only discusses the statutory exception to the final judgment rule in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, another statutory exception is the writ of mandamus as
defined by federal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006). The statute permits interlocutory review
only in “extraordinary” circumstances. See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95-97 (1967)
(explaining the statute’s restrictive application).
77

FED R. CIV. P. 54(b).

78

Id.

79

Sears, Roebuck, & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437-38 (1956). If the party does not
immediately appeal this judgment, then it may not be appealed when the judgment disposing
of all remaining claims is entered. See, e.g., Martineau, supra note 21, at 737.
80

Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 351 U.S. at 432.

81

Id.

82

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).

83

Solimine, supra note 57, at 1535-36.
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appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district
judge or the court of appeals so orders it.84
Under this rule, the authority to allow an immediate appeal shifts from the
district court to the appellate court. The rule differs from section 1292(b), which
requires a party to seek permission to appeal from the district court.85 The Advisory
Committee viewed this departure as a way to “make appeals more readily
available.”86 But like the other exceptions, permission for an interlocutory appeal
under Rule 23(f) will “rarely be given,”87 thus perpetuating inefficiency and
unfairness under the current federal system.
III. DISCUSSION
The ultimate goal of the appellate system is to “expedite the disposition of
interlocutory rulings in which timeliness is essential.”88 In theory, appellate review
provides: (1) uniform results; (2) higher probabilities of correct judgment; and (3)
increased belief that a party’s dispute has been fully and fairly heard.89 In practice,
the result is the opposite.90
Commentators suggest solutions to the problems of the federal interlocutory
system, including: expanding the statutory list of exceptions;91 permitting more
interlocutory appeals;92 and making individual exceptions to the final judgment rule
that permit the immediate appeal of a particular class of orders that the specific
interlocutory order falls.93 These suggestions are not in practice,94 and thus there is

84

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).

85
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES OF
NOVEMBER 9-10, 1995 3 (1995), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/min-cv11.htm.
86

Id. at 2.

87

Id. at 1.

88

Memorandum from Richard Van Duiezend, Principle Court Mgmt. Consultant, Nat’l
Ctr. for State Courts, Introductory Overview of Massachusetts Single Justice Practice (July
2008) (on file with author) (summarizing Massachusetts’s single justice procedure), available
at http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/ appellate/id/129.
89
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal Court: A
Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV. 733, 771 (2006); see
also Dalton, supra note 15, at 62 (“[A]ppellate courts exist to courts exist to correct errors; to
develop legal principles; and to tie geographically dispersed lower courts into a unified,
authoritative legal system.”).
90

See supra Part II.B.

91

Crick, supra note 10, at 563-65. Crick is an early commentator on the final judgment.
He suggests that to expand the statutory scheme, the system must abolish the right to appeal
and the final judgment rule completely. His ideas are still considered amidst the commentary
on the federal appellate system, even though this publication is dated before the creation of
section 1292(b) and the collateral order doctrine.
92

Solimine, supra note 57, at 1171-74, 1193-96.

93

Martineau, supra note 21, at 729.
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minimal evidence that such theories would adequately improve the federal appellate
system.
A. The Hypothesis
This Note does not offer yet another, theoretical proposal; there are plenty of
valuable ideas that have been tested and implemented at the state level that should be
examined for federal use. While most states follow the federal model, some states95
have developed their own systems in an attempt to reduce the confusion and
unfairness created under the federal approach. These state systems often provide the
necessary supporting evidence of what works and what does not. For instance, in
Texas, a petition for an interlocutory appeal could only be made if all the parties and
the trial court judge agreed.96 Agreement was rare, and within the year of enactment,
the Texas legislature removed this hurdle.97
The actual implementation of a method, like in Texas, provides the necessary
proof that can aid a decision of whether to continue with such an approach or
possibly adopt another state’s approach. Every effort may not work, but its
implementation and adoption from the state level embodies federalism’s classic,
central tenet: “states as laboratories”98 in which hypotheses are tested and results
evaluated. It is from these results at the state level that a federal system can
effectively and efficiently develop.
B. The Experiments
1. New York: The All-Appeal System
Making appeals more accessible lessens the resulting unfairness caused by the
federal interlocutory appeals system. This result is evidenced by the approach taken
in New York. On the spectrum of what is appealable, New York is the most
generous.99 New York procedural law permits a petition for interlocutory appeal of
any non-final order regarding legal disputes.100 The rationale behind this liberal
approach helps a party avoid irreparable damage, such as unnecessary costs in

94

While New York and Massachusetts permit all interlocutory appeals, there is little
commentary that references the two states to support this theory.
95
These states include Delaware, Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. See David Scheffel, Interlocutory Appeals in New York—
Time has Come for a More Efficient Approach, 16 PACE L. REV. 607 (1996).
96

Ryan Brannan, Returning Justice to the Judicial System: Procedural Protections from
Frivolous Litigation, TEX. PUB. POL’Y FOUND. POLICYPERSPECTIVE, Apr. 14, 2011, at 1,
available at http://www.texaspolicy.com/pdf/2011-04-PP03-LosersPays-rb.pdf.
97

The change occurred on September 1, 2011. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 51.014 (West 2011).
98

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280-81 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

99

Scheffel, supra note 95, at 613-19 (“New York [is] one of the most liberal jurisdictions
in the United States,” allowing a party to appeal, “by right, almost any civil interlocutory
order.”); see also La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 268 (1957) (citing New York
as an extreme example for allowing review by right of almost any order).
100

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5701 (McKinney 2011).
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continuing with meritless litigation.101 Additionally, New York’s reasons for
adopting this system attempt to avoid some of the federal system’s most common
critiques.102
According to the New York State Bar Association (NYSBA), the rigid federal
model “was not . . . a promising one for New York to follow.”103 Primarily, the
NYSBA argued that the federal model allowed too few certifications for appeal.104
This limitation imposed a risk of irreparable harm because the adversely affected
party could face an unnecessary trial.105 Instead, the New York approach increases
fairness for a party seeking an appeal. This is because all interlocutory issues are
appealable.106
Another benefit of the all-appeal approach is improved efficiency within the
courts. The opportunity to immediately appeal increases efficiency because it
reduces both the risk of a useless trial by providing a quick avenue for error
correction and the amount of time, resources, and money a party would spend in
continuing litigation.107
While the New York approach is advantageous to the parties,108 a main concern
is that it risks unduly burdening the courts. More opportunities to appeal increase a

101

See supra Part II.

102

See supra Part II.B; see also infra notes 103-105.

103

Ellen B. Fishman, State Bar Recognizes Importance of Interlocutory Appeals, 2
LEAVEWORTHY 2, 3 (Summer 2011) [hereinafter NYSBA Report] (New York State Bar
Association (NYSBA) Committee on Courts of Appellate Jurisdiction) (newsletter describing
a study by the NYSBA and Civil Practice Law and Rules’ Committees on New York’s system
of interlocutory appeals); see also N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N (NYSBA) COMM. ON CIVIL
PRACTICE LAW & RULES & COMM. ON COURTS OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION, REPORT ON
INTERLOCUTORY CIVIL APPEALS IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS (Oct. 2010) (report on
Interlocutory Civil Appeals in New York State Courts opining that “a broad right to take
interlocutory appeals, should be maintained.”).
104

NYSBA Report, supra note 103.

105

Id.

106

Id.

“For instance, summary judgment is not infrequently granted on appeal in whole or
part, thus saving the parties and the court system from a wholly unnecessary trial on
some or all of the issues in the case. Likewise, if an order compelling disclosure of a
key piece of evidence is upheld on appeal, that may well encourage the parties to
reach a settlement disposing of the matter entirely.”
Id. (emphasis added).
107

See id.

108

Granted, it is more advantageous for the party seeking an appeal; however, the other
party would still benefit in the cost-reduction and the time saved with the interlocutory appeal,
especially when litigation costs are on the rise. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM GRP. & U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF
MAJOR COMPANIES 3-4 (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/Litigation%20Cost%20Survey%20of%20Major%2
0Companies.pdf.
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burgeoning caseload docket, which critics109 argue imposes an additional burden
upon the court. Along with docket congestion, the ability to immediately appeal any
matter may interrupt, and thus interfere, with the trial court process. As a result,
delays may occur that could also burden the court.110
Those burdens, however, are slight. First, according to NYSBA the current
caseload congestion in New York is not the product of interlocutory appeals.111 The
largest portion of the appellate docket consists of non-interlocutory appeals.112
Second, when a party makes a petition for an interlocutory appeal, the court’s
decision is based upon a minimally developed record. These decisions concern few
questions of law and leave the factual disputes undisturbed.113 Limiting decisions to
fewer legal issues requires shorter appellate opinions, reducing the burden on the
court.114 Thus, adopting an all-appeal system grants parties a fair opportunity to
avoid unnecessary litigation without reducing the efficiency of the courts.
Critics have also argued that the New York approach “may lead to excessive
appellate intrusion, demoralizing the trial judge.”115 Allowing every order to be
appealable without a valid reason is potentially disrespectful to the trial judge. This
“encroach[ment] upon the prerogatives of district court judges” is one reason why
Congress and the Court sought to prohibit non-final appeals.116
This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, the court has a purpose to
administer justice. This purpose supersedes any “encroachment.” Judges are sworn,
under oath, “to do right to all manner of people” whose administrative purpose is to
maintain right, to uphold justice, to protect rights, and “to redress wrongs.”117 Often,
these judges sit on courts that will in some instances function as error-correcting
109

See Scheffel, supra note 95, at 608 (arguing that because New York is facing a caseload
crisis, the all-appeal process must be reevaluated to improve the situation).
110
ROBERT MACCRATE ET AL., APPELLATE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK 87 (1982) (stating
interlocutory appeals take up a significant amount of the appellate courts’ caseload and they
are often used as a delay tactic disrupting the trial process).
111

NYSBA Report, supra note 103.

112

Id. at 2-3.

113

Another supporting argument by NYSBA is that an interlocutory appeal is also taken
without an oral argument, decreasing the potential for a burdened court. Id.
114

Id.

115

Scheffel, supra note 95, at 608; see also Jill Paradise Botler et al., The Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of New York: An Empirical Study of its Powers and Functions
as an Intermediate State Court, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 929, 954 (1979) (stating “free
appealability affords the Appellate Division substantial opportunity to supervise the trial court
and to ensure that its actions are within permissible legal and discretionary bounds.”).
116

Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 603 (2009) (quoting Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981)); see also Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller,
472 U.S. 424, 430 (1985) (“It would also undermine the ability of district judges to supervise
litigation.”).
117

SIR JOHN WILLIAM SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE: OR THE THEORY OF THE LAW 13 (1907).
For further discussion of the error-correcting function of the appellate courts, see Steven
Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUDIES 379
(1995).
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bodies.118 For instance, the NYSBA found several “incidence[s] of modification or
reversal of orders by the Appellate Division”119 demonstrating this error-correcting
function within its state system. Given the court’s purpose and judge’s oath, this
error-correcting component should not be avoided for fear of treading upon the
judge’s feelings. Second, the district court judge maintains authority over the merits
of case even when a party makes a petition. While an appeal pends, the party must
seek permission to stay the underlying case.120 Such stays are rarely granted, thus
the case continues under that judge minimizing any “encroachment” or interruption
of adjudication.121
2. Massachusetts: The All-Appeal System Under a Single Justice
By making interlocutory appeals more accessible, we must make efforts to
reduce the potential burden from increased litigation on the courts. One example of
such effort is in Massachusetts. Massachusetts adopts the same generous standard as
New York in permitting petitions to appeal for all non-final orders.122 Yet,
Massachusetts has a unique approach to the interlocutory appeal procedure. Appeals
are permitted through the discretion of a separate, designated justice at the state
appellate level.123 The justice considers all petitions for review.124 This system gives
the single justice the same power as a full bench, but the interlocutory appeals exist
entirely on a separate docket. The separate bench and docket conserves the appellate
division’s resources because plenary appellate review is avoided and a judge’s
docket is not inundated with interlocutory appeal petitions.125
The sole justice has broad discretion to decide whether to grant the petition for an
appeal, which invokes criticism.126 Under this system, no other justice provides a
118
Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, 13 (1988) (Marshall J., dissenting) (acknowledging
the error-correcting function of the Supreme Court); Irving v. United States, 162 F. 3d 154,
161 (1st Cir. 1998) (explaining that the en banc court authority “to overrule the decision of a
prior panel in the same case flows logically from the error-correcting function of the full
court.”).
119

Memorandum from Ellen B. Fishman to Hon. Stephen Crane, Chair, Civil Practice Law
& Rules Comm., New York State Bar Association (NYSBA) 4 (Sept. 13, 2010) (on file with
author) [hereinafter NYSBA Memorandum] (citing Bentley Kassal, Update: Did the Appellate
Odds Change in 2008? Appellate Statistics in State and Federal Courts, N.Y. STATE BAR
ASS’N J., Nov./Dec. 2009, at 36).
120

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5519 (McKinney 2011).

121

NYSBA Memorandum, supra note 119, at 2-3.

122

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 118 (2011).

123

Id.

124

Scheffel, supra note 95, at 644.

125

See id. The justices take turns sitting as the sole justice for one month at a time serving
on a docket separate from full court proceedings. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, §§ 13, 15
(2011).
126

John H. Henn, Civil Interlocutory Appellate Review Under G.L.M. C. 231, § 118 and
G.L.M. C. 211, § 3, 81 MASS. L. REV. 24, 25 (1996) (“the single justice is given broad
discretion in deciding whether to grant it. A single justice has extensive power to grant relief;
whether he or she will do so is an entirely different matter.”).
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check on a potentially “dangerous”127 power as generally follows in a plenary
appellate system. Additionally, relief from the higher court is rare and invoked only
“to correct and prevent errors and abuses . . . where no other remedy is expressly
provided.”128 The decision requires no accompanying rationale, leaving a party in
the dark as to the reasons for a denial. Thus, a party faces an extremely unfair
system—a system that is highly discretionary, with little guidance of what is
required to achieve an interlocutory appeal, and little relief from the decision.129
To increase fairness under this model, the solution is simple—require written
opinions to accompany the decision.130 The “dangerous power” is thereby
diminished, because the justice could be held responsible for his decision by
providing reasons for it.131 Such accountability may force the justice to craft a
thoughtful opinion.
The simple addition of a written opinion would not burden the single justice
system, because the system exists on a separate docket where judges rotate terms
over the docket. Also, like New York, interlocutory appeals do not make up the
majority of the Massachusetts appellate docket.132 With limited data as to the filing
127

Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of Interlocutory
Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 252-53 (2001).
128
Memorandum from Richard Van Duiezend, supra note 88 (describing the purpose of
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211, § 3); see also Elizabeth McElaney, A Unique Tool for the
Massachusetts Practitioner—Single Justice Review of Interlocutory Orders, 15 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 233, 234 (2010); see also Thibbitts v. Crowley, 539 N.E.2d 1035, 1037
n.5 (1989) (stating that interlocutory appeals are not favored).
129

The party cannot appeal the justice’s decision to deny a petition for an interlocutory
appeal. Thibbitts, 539 N.E.2d at 1037.
130
Currently, Massachusetts does not require the justice to write an opinion. Id. For
further discussion as to the benefits of a mandated written opinion, see Part III.C.
131
Furthermore, justices for the Supreme Judicial Court and the Appeals Court, each with
jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals with a single justice docket, are appointed by the
Governor of Massachusetts with the consent of the Governor’s Executive Council. See MASS.
CONST. ch. II, sec. I, art. IX (describing the justice selection in Massachusetts). Both the
Governor and the Executive Council are elected, and thus there is a political check over the
justices and the threat of a “dangerous” power is further diminished. See MASS. CONST. ch. II,
sec. I, art. II (explaining the process of gubernatorial elections); MASS. CONST. ch. II sec. I
amend. XVI (amended by MASS. CONST. ch. II, sec. I, art XVI) (stating the council election
proceedings).
132

In 2007, a total of 1,984 cases were entered in the Appeals Court, and an additional 647
cases were entered in the single justice docket. The number of entries on the single justice
docket represented a decrease of 7.2 percent from 2006. Report of the Appeals Court:
FY2007, MASS. JUDICIAL BRANCH: MASS. APPEALS COURT, http://www.mass.gov
/courts/appealscourt/2007-report.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2011). In 2008, 2,083 entered the
Appeals Court, with an additional 597 cases presented to the single justice docket, a decrease
of 7.7 percent from 2007. Report of the Appeals Court: FY2008, MASS. JUDICIAL BRANCH:
MASS. APPEALS COURT, http://www.mass.gov/courts/appealscourt/2008-report.html (last
visited Dec. 15, 2011); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD
STATISTICS 2008 (e-mail on file with author) (the National Center has not published the
statistics for 2009, but they are believed to be forthcoming). Not all reported entries concern
interlocutory appeals, demonstrating that the interlocutory appeal, in an all-appeal system, is
not unduly burdening a court with an exorbitant amount of additional appeals. See About the
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rates of interlocutory appeals taken in the federal system, state data offers the
necessary proof that interlocutory appeals, in an all-appeal system, do not
automatically burden the court with an influx of cases.133
Concerns arise that, given the complexity of many federal civil suits, the allappeals system would be ineffective.134 However, the federal circuit has significant
leeway before an all-appeal system would make any impact. In 2009, the United
States Court of Appeals concluded a mere 334 applications for interlocutory appeals,
whereas the termination rate of all appeals reached upwards of 60,508 cases.135 With
over two hundred times the interlocutory appeal rate, it is likely that increasing
access to appeals would have a minimal effect on appellate dockets. However, to
prepare for the caseload increase, employing a single justice with authority over a
separate docket would help conserve resources without sacrificing efficiency, as
demonstrated by Massachusetts.

Court,
MASS.
JUDICIAL
BRANCH:
MASS.
APPEALS
COURT,
http://www.mass.gov/courts/appealscourt/about-the-court.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2011)
(the single justice reviews orders for injunctive relief, “requests for review of summary
process appeal bonds, certain attorney’s fee awards, motions for stays of civil proceedings or
criminal sentences pending appeal, and motions to review impoundment orders.”).
133

See Robertson, supra note 89, at 773 (Robertson argues that the courts’ workload would
dramatically increase because she believes all cases involving privilege claims would be
petitioned for review; however, Robertson fails to offer evidence that those claims would spur
such an increase).
134

Martineau, supra note 21, at 777.

135

ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES: MULTI-YEAR
STATISTICAL COMPILATIONS ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY’S CASELOAD THROUGH FISCAL YEAR
2009 tbl.2.1 and 2.7 (May 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2009/alljudcialfactsandfigures.pdf. Even though there is
no report on the success of such appeals, it is likely safe to presume that the courts continued
their historical support of the final judgment rule and thus, doubtful many applications were
even granted.
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3. Wisconsin: The Discretionary System136
Another model emphasizes the discretion of the judge in making the decision to
grant a petition for review. This approach is the most commonly offered theory on
expanding appellate jurisdiction.137
The American Bar Association (ABA)
promulgated this approach, which Wisconsin adopted and has continued to use for
the past thirty years.138
Like the federal system, the Wisconsin method permits appeals of disputes after
the judgment is formally final.139 However, the Wisconsin system also permits
petitions for interlocutory appeals if the case qualifies for review under the
“whenever justice requires” exception in the Wisconsin statute.140 This provision
authorizes a judge to use broad discretion when reviewing and determining if an
appeal is warranted.141 The exception effectively eliminates the judicially created
136
Other states adopt discretionary approaches in their state statutes, but their methods are
not discussed in this Note. These include Delaware, DEL. SUP. CT. R. 42 (d)(v) (“[T]his Court
shall . . . determine in its discretion whether to accept or refuse the interlocutory appeal . . . .
In exercising that discretion, this Court may consider all relevant factors, including the
decision of the trial court, whether to certify interlocutory appeal.”); Georgia, GA. SUP. CT. R.
31 (granting permission to appeal interlocutory order in three instances: “(1) [t]he issue to be
decided appears to be dispositive of the case; (2) [t]he order appears erroneous and will
probably cause a substantial error at trial; or (3) [t]he establishment of a precedent is
desirable.”); Maine, ME. R. RAP. 24(c) (“If the trial court is of the opinion that a question of
law involved in an interlocutory order or ruling made by it ought to be determined by the Law
Court before any further proceedings are taken, it may on motion of the aggrieved party report
the case to the Law Court for that purpose and stay all further proceedings except such as are
necessary to preserve the rights of the parties without making any decision therein.”); New
Jersey, N.J. R. 2:2-4 (declaring “the Appellate Division may grant leave to appeal, in the
interest of justice, from any interlocutory order . . . if the final judgment, decision or action
thereof is appealable as of right pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a).”); and Washington, WA. RAP.
2.3(b)(1)-(4) (stating that review will be granted if the lower court: “has committed an obvious
error which would render further proceedings useless; . . . [or] has committed probable error
and the decision . . . substantially alters the status quo or substantially limits the freedom of a
party to act; . . . [or] has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure . . . as to call for review by the appellate
court; . . . [or] superior court has certified, or that all parties to the litigation have stipulated.”).
137

See, e.g., Martineau, supra note 21, at 788; Nagel, supra note 32, at 201.

138

Andrew Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in
Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1661 (2011).
139

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 808.03(1) (West 2011) (providing that “[a] final judgment or final
order is a judgment or order entered in accordance with sections 806.06(1)(b) or 807.11(2)
[when it is filed with the office of the clerk of the court]. . . .”).
140

Nagel, supra note 32, at 216.

141

Wisconsin granted appeals in cases involving double jeopardy (State v. Fischer, No. 902855-CR, 1991 Wis. App. LEXIS 220 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1991)), appointment of counsel
in a civil contempt action (Brotzman v. Brotzman, 283 N.W.2d 600 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979)),
jurisdiction over a minor by a juvenile court (G.B.K. v. State, 376 N.W.2d 385 (Wis. Ct. App.
1985) (minor accused of murder)), a claim that a delinquency petition was untimely (C.A.K.
v. State, 433 N.W.2d 298 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988), aff’d, 453 N.W.2d 897 (Wis. 1990)), subjectmatter jurisdiction in an insurance dispute (Sipl v. Sentry Indem. Co., 431 N.W.2d 685 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1988)), choice of law (Gavers v. Fed. Life Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 900 (Wis. Ct. App.
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exceptions to the final judgment rule, because all decisions lie within the discretion
of the judge as opposed to the generic, confusing list of criteria used in the federal
system.142
The criteria for discretionary review are whether (1) the termination of the
proceedings will be materially advanced, (2) the proceedings will be clarified, (3) the
litigant will suffer substantial or irreparable harm absent appeal, or (4) appeal will
clarify an issue of general importance.143 This language provides that discretion
apply on a case-by-case basis. Although this approach may promote fairness,144 the
broad language has its drawbacks. Specifically, relying on four, general criteria
could lead to the same confusion as the circuits’ application of the collateral order
doctrine criteria. Additionally, judges are not required to give a reason for a denial,
and yet they have the discretion to deny for an unrelated matter.145 The combination
of the powerful discretion and the lack of an explanation create an unpredictable and
unfair environment for the parties.
Despite this drawback, the Wisconsin discretionary approach is a technique that
can be readily adopted in the federal model and is highly beneficial for purposes of
judicial efficiency. First, relying on the discretion of judges eliminates the need to
create more exceptions where much of the confusion between the circuits lies.
Second, imposing a discretionary model improves judicial efficiency because it
reduces judges’ decision-making time.146 Lastly, invoking judicial discretion causes
1984)), refusal to submit to a blood test as civil contempt (State v. A.W.O., 344 N.W.2d 200
(Wis. Ct. App. 1983)), an order compelling testimony of a minor in a child abuse prosecution
(State v. Gilbert, 326 N.W.2d 744 (Wis. 1982)), constitutionality of judicial substitution
statutes postponement of hearing on a petition to vacate a street (Selk v. Twp. of Minocqua,
422 N.W.2d 889 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (court of appeals granted petition to appeal and in turn
certified case to supreme court)), statutory construction (State v. Holmes, 315 N.W.2d 703
(Wis. 1982)), disqualification of a party’s attorney, change of venue (Irby v. Young, 407
N.W.2d 314 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987)), and discovery (Vincent & Vincent, Inc. v. Spacek, 306
N.W.2d 85 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (appeal from order denying a protective order and directing
party to answer series of written interrogatories)).
142

See Part II.C.2.

143

See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 808.03(2) (West 2011).

144

Martineau, supra note 21, at 782.

145

Id. at 777.

146

See supra note 60. The judge would avoid the multi-step criteria often required when
analyzing a petition for interlocutory review. In an early case, the Fifth Circuit made an astute
observation on the need for a judge’s discretion:
[Section 1292(b)] was a judge-sought, judge-made, judge-sponsored enactment.
Federal Judges from their prior professional practice, and more so from experience
gained in the adjudication of today’s complex litigation, were acutely aware of two
principal things. First, certainty and dispatch in the completion of judicial business
makes piecemeal appeal as permitted in some states undesirable. But second, there
are occasions which defy precise delineation or description in which as a practical
matter orderly administration is frustrated by the necessity of a waste of precious
judicial time while the case grinds through to a final judgment as the sole medium
through which to test the correctness of some isolated identifiable point of fact, of law,
of substance or procedure, upon which in a realistic way the whole case or defense
will turn. The amendment was to give to the appellate machinery of [28 U.S.C.] §
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little change to the federal system, because the federal system already applies a
highly discretionary standard for certification of interlocutory appeals.147
C. A Long-Term Solution: Mandating Written Opinions
Adopting the states’ methods will improve fairness and efficiency without
unduly burdening courts.148 A requirement of a written opinion could shed light on
any inconsistencies or trends between the circuits.149 For instance, if an exorbitant
number of judges decide to deny an interlocutory appeal for reasons of case
congestion, the legislature could seek steps to alleviate this trend. Additionally, the
opinions would aid in predicting a party’s chance to prevail while providing the
information necessary to make an educated decision to petition for an interlocutory
appeal. Moreover, if a party decides to petition, an explanation accompanying the
decision provides a helpful check on the justice as to whether he fairly considered
the petition without wasting the party’s time and finances.150
1. Quantitative Data
Currently, there is no way to know the exact rationale of the courts, because there
is no mandatory requirement to draft opinions for decisions involving either section
1292(b) or the collateral order doctrine.151 All that is required is for the district court
to provide a minimal statement as to whether the statutory criteria has been
satisfied.152 The statement need not include the grounds for the judge’s certification,
and therefore even “cryptic orders have proved effective, even to the point of
supporting appeal without expressly stating the controlling question.”153 Parties are

1291. . . a considerable flexibility operating under the immediate, sole and broad
control of Judges so that within reasonable limits disadvantages of piecemeal and final
judgment appeals might both be avoided.
Hadjipateras v. Pacifica, S.A., 290 F.2d 697, 702-03 (5th Cir. 1961).
147

See Part II.

148

See Parts III.A-C.

149

Assuming the Wisconsin method is not adopted, the opinions would also give
information on the manner in which the current federal standards, such as the Cohen criteria,
are defined.
150
The single justice process is also informal, requiring that the aggrieved party file his or
her petition within thirty days of the issuance of the order. See Scheffel, supra note 95, at
624.
151
The majority of the state statutes simply mirror the federal model. Thus, the states
impose a duty on the district court, when certifying an appeal, to explain their reasonings for
the appeal. See, e.g., Town of Fitchburg v. City of Madison, 299 N.W.2d 199, 210 n.4 (Wis.
1980) (explaining that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin would not review the appellate court’s
decision to refuse to hear an interlocutory appeal).
152

See generally 16 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3930 (2d ed. 1996).
153

Id.
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thus left in the dark as to the reasons for denials and potentially unable to predict the
petition’s success.154
Withholding an explanation for a denial diminishes a prime opportunity to see
the inner workings of the courts, explain judiciary behavior, and collect evidence of
problems or trends in decisions. Judge Posner adequately described the difficulty in
assessing the judiciary’s behavior as “a mystery that is also an embarrassment.”155
Still, we are dealt with a system where Congress authorized courts to deny an
application for an interlocutory appeal when,
[B]ased upon a view that the question involved was not a controlling
issue. It could be denied on the basis that the docket of the circuit court of
appeals was such that the appeal could not be entertained for too long a
period of time. But, whatever the reason, the ultimate determination
concerning the right of appeal is within the discretion of the judges of the
appropriate circuit court of appeals.156
Such authority may result in a variety of reasons for a denial, or the petition may
be denied solely because of case congestion. Unfortunately, there is no way to know
for certain which it may be. Absent an explanation, a court of appeals may even
conclude that the district judge failed to consider the relevant statutory criteria, when
in fact the judge properly did so.
Additionally, the federal courts allow judicial discretion on interlocutory appeal
decisions. Judges are best suited to make an educated decision, because they know
their docket and their cases.157 Without a rationale, we are excluded from some of
the purest data on the court systems.
2. Qualitative Data
Lack of an opinion is just as harmful when a decision to “grant” the petition is
made. Currently, the federal model is an “unacceptable morass,”158 “manag[ing] to
be at once redundant, incomplete, and unclear.”159 The inability to clearly define the

154
An argument can be raised that a petitioner could assess the success rate because most
petitions for interlocutory appeal are denied. See Part II. However, as circuit splits go
unresolved, the rising confusion regarding the differing criteria could cause difficulty in
predicting outcomes or potentially force a party to change strategy in selecting the forum. This
is an assumption by the author.
155

Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 10 (1993).
156

S. REP NO 85-2434 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5255, 5257.

157

These judges are the most knowledgeable on the issue because they were the authority
over the record. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985) (“[T]he
district judge can better exercise [his or her] responsibility [to police the prejudgment tactics
of litigants] if the appellate courts do not repeatedly intervene to second-guess prejudgment
rulings.”).
158

Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the Federal Finality-Appealability Problem, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 172 (1984).
159

Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir. 1986).
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exceptions has produced widespread dissatisfaction.160 The need for clarification is
extremely important given the current state of litigation.161 Specifically, written
opinions would offer insight into circuit splits or specific cases that are often granted
for interlocutory review. Such information could aid the legislature in enacting new
guidelines for interlocutory review, or help both the legislature and the Court to
definitively permit interlocutory review for a specific issue.162 By providing clarity
to interlocutory appeal criteria, steps can be taken towards developing a more
expansive interlocutory appeal practice.163
IV. CONCLUSION
Changes are slow and arguably ineffective in improving fairness and efficiency.
The Court and Congress skewed the rules in such a manner to continue adhering to
the final judgment rule. First, Congress appeared to have answered the discontent in
the finality requirement by introducing section 1292(b). On its face, this doctrine
appears to ameliorate the litigant’s concern for fairness and efficiency. However, its
application to few interlocutory orders did not come close to improving fairness and
efficiency or even addressing the litigant’s concerns.

160

See, e.g., FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 95 (1990). The Committee explained,

REPORT OF

The state of the law on when a district court ruling is appealable because it is “final,”
or is an appealable interlocutory action, strikes many observers as unsatisfactory in
several respects. The area has produced much purely procedural litigation. Courts of
appeals often dismiss appeals as premature. Litigants sometimes face the possibility
of waiving their right to appeal when they fail to seek timely review because it is
unclear when a decision is “final” and the time for appeal begins to run. Decisional
doctrines—such as “practical finality” and especially the “collateral order” rule—blur
the edges of the finality principle, require repeated attention from the Supreme Court,
and may in some circumstances restrict too sharply the opportunity for interlocutory
review.
Id.; see also Martineau, supra note 21, at 747.
161
Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, U.S. COURTS tbl.B (2011), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatist
ics/2011/tables/B00Mar11.pdf. Even in state courts, where, over the past nine years, civil
caseloads increased twenty-eight percent. Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Civil Caseloads Level
Off After Three Years of Growth, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT (2010) [hereinafter Nat’l Ctr. for
State Courts], http://www.courtstatistics.org/Civil/ CivilGrowth.aspx.
162
Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, supra note 161. Currently, a common trend is expanding
interlocutory review in cases involving class actions and patents. See Thomas D. Nevins,
Interlocutory Appeal from Denial of Twombly Motion to Dismiss in Text Messaging Antitrust
at
http://www.natlawreview.
Litigation,
NAT’L L. REV. (2010), available
com/article/interlocutory-appeal-denial-twombly-motion-to-dismiss-text-messaging-antitrustlitigation. Thus, information on decision-making could help the legislature and the Court
clarify criteria regarding interlocutory appeals.
163

The main benefactor from this clarity will likely be the Supreme Court. Recent circuit
splits have been resolved on the issues of interlocutory appeal by the Court. See supra note
28. More information on judicial decisions and rationales would likely shed light on the
existence of other splits and potential issues that need to be resolved.
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Second, the Court employed a similar tactic by judicially creating the collateral
order doctrine. The doctrine allows petitions for interlocutory appeals, but the
ultimate authority to grant such an appeal lies within the judiciary—the original
proponent of the final judgment rule.
Third, circuits apply various definitions to explain the collateral order doctrine’s
factors. For such an important rule, the doctrine does not aptly specify the
conditions, nor has the Supreme Court sought to define the factors that would grant
immediate appeals of non-final orders. Granted, the courts share the goal of finality,
resulting in consistent decisions; however, there is no uniformity in decisions that
aid a party in preparing for court, because there is no way to predict what the court
may decide.
Commentators offer several suggestions164 that lack evidentiary support, leading
to more criticisms. The state court models provide legitimate examples that give
credence to an argument for change. They provide concrete evidence of what works
and what does not. The method is simple:
(1) Permit petitions of all interlocutory appeals;
(2) A single justice at the appellate level renders a decision based upon
that judge’s discretion; and
(3) Mandate written opinions explaining the decision to grant or deny a
petition for interlocutory appeal.
Allowing all appeals would promote fairness without inundating the court,
because the single justice’s discretionary power and separate docket would conserve
resources and promote judicial efficiency. Additionally, the written opinions would
provide clarity and predictability to aid litigation strategies. This combination would
enhance the original goal165 of expediting the dispute through the appellate system,
with the added benefit of improving efficiency and maintaining fairness.

164

See supra notes 91-93.

165

See Memorandum from Richard Van Duiezend, supra note 88. Appellate review also
provides: (1) uniform results; (2) higher probabilities of correct judgment; and (3) increased
belief that a party’s dispute has been fully and fairly heard, which my approach would
continue to uphold; see also Robertson, supra note 89.
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